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Child Care Was Challenging Before the 
Pandemic
Child care is foundational to the economy. Without 
it, many parents cannot work or reach their career 
potential. As child care programs rapidly closed in 
the COVID-19 pandemic, the degree to which work 
is enabled by child care became obvious,1 particularly 
for the 14 percent of workers parenting a child under 
age 6.2 Analyses of data collected in May and June 
2020 found that 13 percent of working parents lost a 
job or reduced their hours due to a lack of child care.3 
Today, the pandemic has made broadly evident 
what was already clear to America’s parents, employ-
ers, and care providers: the nation’s early childhood 
care system is fragile. Working parents face inter-
secting challenges as they seek high-quality, afford-
able care that is suitable for the ages of their children 
and available when and where they need it. One in 
four families paying for care spend more than 10 
percent of their income on that care,4 well above the 
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services’ 
suggested affordability threshold of 7 percent.5  
Half of Americans live in a child care desert,6 where 
access to formal quality care is essentially absent. 
And for parents living in a remote place, working 
nonstandard hours or having multiple young chil-
dren, options are even more limited. 
As pandemic-related strains to the child care 
system unfold atop this shaky foundation, we outline 
existing and new challenges, and we highlight pos-
sibilities for repairing the broken systems caring for 
our nation’s youngest children.
High Operating Costs Make Child Care 
Expensive for Parents, Unprofitable for 
Providers  
Despite the high cost to parents, licensed child care 
providers of all sizes struggle to generate a profit. 
For most child care programs, costs for space and 
materials are fixed, although they are relatively 
small in comparison to labor costs. Child care is a 
labor-intensive field, requiring many staff to care for 
children at mandated child-to-staff ratios, but the 
wages of individual workers are low. Most programs 
cannot afford to pay living wages, and benefits are 
scarce, despite the need for highly credentialed staff.7 
Revenue increases typically would have to come from 
charging higher tuition, which would make many 
more families unable to afford quality care.
This dichotomy of high costs for families and low 
wages for workers derives from child care being a mostly 
private-pay system with limited public contributions. One 
outcome is high turnover as employees seek higher pay 
outside the industry, often in the public school system.8  
Child care sits in stark contrast to publicly funded educa-
tion, where teachers are paid significantly more than child 
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care workers, have greater job security, and are typically 
offered benefits such as health insurance, paid sick leave, 
and retirement plans.9 Tensions between the push toward 
better-credentialed staff in the name of enhancing quality, 
inequities between pay for early childhood and public 
school educators, and high staff turnover have been bub-
bling toward a crisis for years.
These challenges pre-date the pandemic but have 
been exacerbated by the recent months of economic 
shutdown and health concerns. Many child care pro-
grams were forced to close at the onset of the pan-
demic, and others did so voluntarily out of concern 
for the health of their workers and the families they 
serve.10 As the economy reopens, four major concerns 
are at the fore both for parents and providers.
First, although some programs received assis-
tance through CARES Act funding and forgivable 
Payroll Protection Program (PPP) loans, and though 
many laid-off workers were eligible for enhanced 
unemployment assistance, access has been uneven. 
The challenges of navigating funding may have 
been particularly acute for family child care, often 
operated by mothers in need of care for their own 
children and often without resources such as a well-
connected board or employees with business acu-
men. For some, language barriers may have made 
accessing funds even more complex. 
Second, for some programs staff shortages may be 
a pressing issue. Some child care workers ineligible 
for unemployment or seeking the security of a job 
may have found work elsewhere, though the extent of 
this is unknown and may be small given the scarcity 
of jobs and health concerns. Others may be unable 
to return to work if schools remain closed and their 
own children need care, or if they have concerns for 
their own health that preclude their return to a high-
exposure environment like child care. On the other 
hand, the loosening of the labor market and changes 
in parent demand (discussed below) may counteract 
these shortages; the full extent of staffing concerns is 
still unknown and will take time to unfold. 
Third, for center-based programs, facility costs like 
rent and insurance have continued to accrue, even 
without an inflow of tuition. And for those that have 
remained consistently open, dwindled enrollment may 
not have been enough to offset ongoing costs. Taken 
together, at least some child care programs were unable 
to stay viable and have shuttered their doors for good. 
Finally, for programs that have remained afloat 
and have reopened or will soon, surviving the shut-
downs is not the end of their financial pressures. As 
child care providers reopen, the ongoing health risks 
have led the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention (CDC) to recommend enhanced saniti-
zation protocols and new restrictions on class sizes 
(see below), all of which are keeping operation costs 
high while reducing the number of families paying 
tuition.11 Even programs that survived the closures 
may not be able to continue operations.12 
COVID-19’s Squeeze on Child Care Supply
Child care providers have been navigating a maze of pos-
sibilities in the pandemic, including whether and how to 
reopen when allowed by state and local guidelines. The 
CDC provides ongoing guidance for child care centers 
that are open, including hygiene measures like handwash-
ing and increased cleaning and instructions that staff and 
children stay home when sick.13 Other considerations 
include social distancing strategies such as reducing the 
number of children and staff in a group, eliminating mix-
ing between groups when possible, and spacing children 
apart for naps and meals, along with screening and health 
checks for all staff and children.14 
The implications of these new precautions are 
multiple. First, with guidelines around smaller group 
sizes and the need for more physical distance between 
children during indoor activities, existing facilities 
cannot accommodate their usual enrollment capaci-
ties.15 A June 2020 survey of child care providers from 
the National Association for the Education of Young 
Children (NAEYC) found that 86 percent of respon-
dents working in open programs said their program was 
serving fewer children than before the pandemic, with 
enrollment down an average of 67 percent.16 Second, 
despite fewer children present, requirements for more 
intensive cleaning and dividing children into separate 
spaces, each needing adequate supervision, means staff-
ing needs are still high. Finally, providers must procure 
personal protective equipment, cleaning supplies,17 and 
materials to support distancing between children (e.g., 
non-shared art and sensory supplies) generally without 
new funds to offset these costs. Together, these new 
realities translate into higher costs of operation for child 
care programs, with fewer tuition dollars coming in to 
support those costs. Although there are some federal 
dollars flowing to child care now, these allocations are 
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insufficient for many operators, and concerns exist about 
continued viability when loans through the PPP expire 
and CARES Act funding is exhausted by the end of the 
year. Policies like continuing payment of subsidies and 
parent co-payments to programs even when closed and 
pay increases for workers are also temporary and not 
enduring solutions.18 
Nationally, it is unclear how long child care pro-
viders can sustain themselves without fuller exter-
nal investments. In April, the Center for American 
Progress extrapolated from provider data collected 
by NAEYC in mid-March to estimate a loss of almost 
4.5 million licensed slots—half of the already-inad-
equate nationwide supply.19 However, the NAEYC 
data underlying the estimates were collected before 
the CARES Act was passed,20 which along with the 
PPP loans included Child Care Development Block 
Grant funds to mobilize care for essential workers; 
funding for the Educational Stabilization Fund, which 
supports some state early education programs; and 
additional Head Start allocations.21 Although some 
providers reported that relief funds were difficult to 
access or inadequate,22 it is yet unknown how esti-
mated losses of slots might have been stemmed or 
delayed by these funds. More recent data, however, 
suggest these funds were not a panacea, and the June 
child care provider survey from the NAEYC found 
that only 18 percent of respondents expected their 
program to survive longer than a year (note that this 
sample was not random nor representative but did 
include respondents from every state).23
At least one state has sought to quantify provider 
losses. The Wisconsin Policy Forum found that 39 per-
cent of its state’s licensed providers had closed by May 
19,24 although it is not clear that these closures were 
all permanent.25 In some hard-hit states like Arizona, 
child care programs reopened, experienced a cluster 
of COVID-19 cases, and closed again;26 some closed 
indefinitely.27 In short, it is unknown to what extent 
child care closures and losses will be sustained and to 
what extent supply will be irrevocably changed.28 
Absent additional support for the child care sector, 
national supply of child care is likely to be dramatically 
reduced overall, posing a distinct challenge to economic 
recovery and creating hardship for the working parents of 
young children and for the more than 1 million child care 
workers (as of February 2020) who provide that care.29 
Demand for Child Care Is Likely to Change, 
but How Is Largely Unknown
As the nation moved unevenly into stay-at-home 
orders and then into various stages of phased re-open-
ings, March and April’s job losses still have not been 
fully recovered,30 with unemployment rates rising from 
3.5 percent in February to 11.1 percent in June.31 Jobs 
may eventually recover, but it could take years as many 
businesses permanently shutter and the underlying 
health situation persists. 
For those who remain employed or who find new 
work, it is not clear what demand for child care will 
look like moving forward. However, the contributing 
factors are varied and vast:
• High unemployment means fewer parents are 
working, and until they return to work they are 
unlikely to demand pre-pandemic levels of care. 
However, the reverse is also true: until child 
care is available to parents, they will face serious 
challenges in returning to pre-pandemic levels 
of work.
• With more workplaces transitioning to work-
from-home models, whether permanently or 
not, parents may be able to arrange schedules to 
stay at home with children during what used to 
be usual daytime work hours, or to stagger their 
hours with a co-parent and reduce demand for 
care. Additionally, working from home may alter 
the geography of child care needs, increasing 
demand for care in residential areas rather than 
areas closer to the workplace.
• Families who usually relied on informal care 
from older relatives (e.g., grandparents) may find 
themselves seeking more formal care than usual 
to avoid compromising their relatives’ health. 
• Families with school-age children may need 
substantially more care than is typically avail-
able for this age group, given the uneven spread 
of remote learning, hybrid learning with rotat-
ing in-person attendance, and possible closures 
among schools that do re-open. This demand 
will vary substantially at finely grained geogra-
phies, sometimes district-by-district, making it 
difficult to quantify for now.
                                                                                                                                                        C A R S E Y  S C H O O L  O F  P U B L I C  P O L I C Y       3
• School delivery models may have implications for 
younger children, too. If older children are not in 
school, families who have younger children may 
opt out of child care altogether, planning to stay 
home, thereby pushing demand down.
• Families concerned about children’s socioemo-
tional well-being may be especially eager to 
return to structured routines and be back to  
pre-pandemic demand levels. 
• Until an effective vaccine is widely administered, 
parents may be uncomfortable with the health 
risks of sending children to child care. The 
NAEYC reports that 72 percent of respondents 
to their child care survey regularly heard from 
their families that they aren’t comfortable send-
ing their children back to care. 
• Among those needing to use child care, demand 
may shift to smaller in-home care or nanny/baby-
sitter options, given greater potential viral expo-
sure in center-based care. 
• Finally, the pandemic has wrought changes in 
individual families that are hard to quantify yet: 
new constraints around work hours, transporta-
tion availability, disposable income, health status, 
and informal supports may all shape child care 
needs in ways that are both new and still fluid. 
For example, early evidence indicates women’s 
employment has declined more than men’s.32 It 
is unclear the extent to which this is driven by 
children’s care needs or industry/occupation, but 
in any case it is likely many women may opt out 
of employment until their young children enter 
school, given new barriers to child care. 
Table 1 summarizes the effect of these factors on 
the demand for formal child care. The overall demand 
is unclear now, and that ambiguity is likely to con-
tinue as the health crisis and the economic recession 
persist. Lower demand may keep child care more 
accessible in the short term, even with decreased 
supply. But if parents are to eventually resume pre-
pandemic labor force activity, it is unlikely that all, 
particularly lower-earning workers, will be able to 
generate alternative arrangements that do not involve 
additional formal child care. At that point, demand 
will increase and supply will be insufficient. 
The Evolving Inequities of Child Care 
Absent policy intervention and sizable investments, 
access to formal child care slots is likely to become 
elusive for all but the highest-income families during 
traditional working hours. These families will still have 
options, including accessing care through a now-
higher-priced center, or through in-home or nanny 
care. Faced with a shrinking supply, it is possible that 
more affluent families will increasingly leverage work-
related flexibilities or access care in different ways, like 
through neighborhood co-ops, and perhaps desire less 
formal care than before the pandemic. 
Workers without this flexibility, however, will still 
need child care at usual levels; as less-flexible jobs tend 
to be lower paid, it is the workers who need care the 
most who will be least able to afford it. This scenario 
has major equity implications for lower-income parents’ 
ability to remain employed. Without systemic change, 
we are likely to see widening disparities in child care 
access across income and race-ethnicity, as well as dis-
parities in parents’ ability to work across income, race/
ethnicity, and gender lines. Those who need lower-cost 
options, flexibility, and nonstandard care—including 
the front-line workers spotlighted by the pandemic, like 
health, retail, and delivery workers—will be precluded 
from access. Further inequities will be evident between 
parents’ and childless adults’ abilities to reach their 
labor market potential. Each calcifying disparity has 
dramatic implications for how and to what extent we 
can rebuild the economy. 
TABLE 1. FACTORS INFLUENCING DEMAND FOR FORMAL 
CHILD CARE 
Note: Arrows indicate whether each factor is likely to increase (up) or decrease (down) 
demand for formal child care.
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As higher operational costs and lower density 
requirements continue, programs will deplete any 
remaining savings and pass costs on to families, absent 
outside assistance. Communities hardest hit by job 
losses and populated with families who were already 
struggling pre-pandemic and least able to pay for child 
care tuition are the communities most likely to see 
their local child care programs fold.33 Together, these 
higher prices and restricted slots mean that access 
to formal child care could increasingly become the 
domain of families with the most resources.
Further, the shrinking numbers of child care provid-
ers don’t just affect families seeking care, but also the 
workers who supply that care. Child care as an industry 
lost 370,000 jobs between February and April 2020, less 
than half of which had been recovered as of June 1.34 
The industry is almost exclusively populated by women, 
40 percent of whom are women of color. 35 Further, 
within the industry, women of color (particularly Black 
women) are more likely to work in assistant teacher roles 
and with the youngest children,36 meaning that they 
are likely to have been paid the least to begin with and 
be among the least able to buffer these job losses with 
savings and other resources. Even before the pandemic, 
these workers were in a precarious economic situation 
and, absent policy solutions, that precarity is likely to 
continue, and be accompanied by the increased health 
risks they face interacting with children and families 
during the pandemic.
The Push to Improve Child Care
A sizable investment is required to stabilize and sup-
port the child care industry, as evidenced by countries 
that have made this a priority.37 On July 29, 2020, the 
U.S. House of Representatives passed the Child Care 
Is Essential Act, which would allocate $50 billion 
toward personnel, sanitation, training, and other costs 
of operating child care programs in the pandemic.38 
A companion bill in the Senate would fold child 
care relief into broader education legislation.39 The 
House also passed a second bill, the Child Care for 
Economic Recovery Act, which includes $10 billion 
for grants aimed at constructing or improving child 
care facilities. This total of $60 billion in direct fund-
ing to the child care industry would be supplemented 
with additional funding to provide care to children 
of essential workers and to provide tax relief.40 These 
allocations meet or exceed recommendations by 
various industry experts, including the NAEYC, 
which called for $50 billion in March,41 and Senators 
Elizabeth Warren (D-MA) and Tina Smith (D-MN), 
who called for the same amount in April.42 A May 
2020 op-ed from researchers at the Federal Reserve 
Bank of Boston did not include a specific price tag, 
but it urged policymakers “to be bold” 43 in thinking 
about how to stabilize the child care industry and to 
consider an increase in funding that could signifi-
cantly change the child care system rather than just 
return it to its pre-pandemic status. Finally, presumed 
Democratic presidential nominee Joe Biden recently 
unveiled a $775 billion plan for supporting caregiv-
ing industries (both children and elders); it includes 
tax credits and subsidies for lower-income families 
paying for child care, tax incentives for businesses to 
build onsite child care, universal pre-kindergarten, 
and pay increases for early childhood educators.44 
Identifying precisely how to best rebuild is a work 
in progress. Because of the enduring challenges fac-
ing child care, efforts to restructure the industry and 
broaden access to quality care pre-date the pandemic. 
Most pre-pandemic plans targeted cost-related chal-
lenges, including a possible expansion of the child 
and dependent care tax credit (enhancing the value 
and making it refundable), to widen access for lower-
income households.45 Other approaches have included 
setting affordability thresholds for families and pro-
viding free care to the lowest earners.46 The Trump 
administration has also expressed interest in address-
ing the issue, providing a statement on its principles for 
child care reform in December 2019.47 Aside from the 
questions around funding and the high price tag of the 
plans, questions raised at the time around disadvan-
tages for families who prefer non-licensed care (e.g., 
relying on a relative or a stay-at-home parent)48 take  
on increased salience in the pandemic context. 
The current push to support existing child care 
programs with infrastructure improvements and more 
training and better wages for providers is a positive 
step in addressing some of the most pressing challenges 
described above. However, child care slots are not evenly 
distributed, and increasing access for families in places 
facing shortages of quality slots pre-pandemic—includ-
ing in rural places, low-income neighborhoods, and in 
some communities of color49—is not an easy task. Many 
of the challenges driving pre-pandemic slot shortages 
are likely to remain relevant barriers post-pandemic; 
for instance, in rural America, staffing existing and 
new child care centers may be a challenge in an aging 
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workforce50 that is at higher risk of COVID-19-related 
mortality.51 In any attempt to rebuild and improve the 
child care industry, efforts to target inequity in access 
will need to be made explicit to avoid reinforcing old 
disparities. One area in particular need of attention is 
the availability of quality care outside of standard work 
hours. Low-wage service-sector workers, dispropor-
tionately women and people of color,52 must navigate 
the compounding challenges of low-wage work and the 
need to secure child care during off hours. Importantly, 
any efforts to fully engage families with child care 
and work will have to account for the new realities of 
pandemic life. These include families’ newly developed 
preferences and constraints, the looming possibility 
of openings and re-closings due to viral spread, and, 
importantly, the need to deal with children and families 
who may have faced serious hardship and trauma in the 
preceding months.53 
Whether families are struggling with the losses of a 
difficult economy or the benefits of increased workplace 
flexibility, 54 having the support of a quality, safe, afford-





2. Refers to the share of workers who are biological, 
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the house. Authors’ analysis of U.S. Census Bureau American 
Community Survey data, 2018 five-year estimates via 
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6. According to the Center for American Progress, 51 percent 
of Americans lived in a census tract where there is no licensed 
child care provider or there are more than three children 
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care-facility-in-new-hanover-county/; for more on child care 
programs that have opened and had to (re)close see https://www.
miamiherald.com/news/coronavirus/article243670537.html.
28. A survey from the Bipartisan Policy Center indicated 
that 60 percent of providers had closed when the data were 
collected March 31–April 4 (https://bipartisanpolicy.org/blog/
nationwide-survey-child-care-in-the-time-of-coronavirus/). 
However, the survey methodology indicates that these data 
were collected among parents, not providers, and the data are 
better described as more than 60 percent of parents reported 
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37. Publicly funded child care is expensive, even in more 
typical times. While countries in the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development average 0.7% 
of gross domestic product on care, France and the Nordic 
countries spend much more and the United States less, at 
about 0.5%. This suggests the United States would need 
to dramatically increase its commitment, likely to more 
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